Global retail CBDC pilot comparison matrix — Africa, Caribbean, Asia, UK

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This entry sits under fintech index as the cross-jurisdiction comparison matrix for the seven most-cited live or in-design retail CBDC programmes. It complements the per-jurisdiction deep dives at Nigeria eNaira, Bahamas Sand Dollar, Jamaica JAM-DEX, BoE digital pound consultation, and e-CNY supply-chain expansion by enabling side-by-side reading rather than narrative-by-narrative reading. For architecture context see CBDC multi-tier architecture overview, CBDC three operating paradigms, and four core trade-offs in CBDC architecture selection; for the four-country adoption curve see CBDC adoption curve 2026; for the wholesale-bridge layer see mBridge and BIS Project Agorá.

[!info] TL;DR Seven retail-CBDC programmes anchor the 2026-05 public dataset: Sand Dollar (Bahamas, live 2020-10, longest-running), e-CNY (China, live pilots from 2020-04, largest-by-registered-wallets), DCash (ECCB, pilot 2021-03, discontinued 2024-01), eNaira (Nigeria, live 2021-10, canonical adoption-failure case), JAM-DEX (Jamaica, live 2022-07, cleanest small-economy adoption), Bakong (Cambodia, live 2020-10, technically a payment-system + quasi-CBDC hybrid), and digital pound (UK, design phase since 2024, no decision to launch). Read across the matrix the structural pattern emerges: technology vendor choice (Bitt vs eCurrency Mint vs in-house) is downstream of distribution-incentive design, legal-tender status correlates with explicit legislative authorisation rather than market acceptance, and adoption percentage tracks distribution-channel-ownership (PBoC’s state-bank mandate, NCB Lynk anchor, vs Bahamas multi-AFI dilution, vs Nigeria DMB+MMO incentive misalignment).

Why a seven-pole comparison

The single-issuer narrative (“retail CBDCs are working in some places, failing in others”) is correct but unhelpful — it does not isolate which design choices drive which outcomes. By placing all seven programmes side-by-side on statute / issuance model / wallet model / KYC tiers / adoption / technology vendor / interoperability, the structural correlations become visible. The matrix view also shows the DCash discontinuation as not a one-off failure but the visible tail of a pattern (small-economy + multi-AFI + Bitt-vendor + no anchor wallet + no enrolment incentive) that also constrains Sand Dollar and eNaira. For the broader CBDC vs private-rail competitive backdrop see EM crypto dollarization pattern and gray-market dollar formalization.

Matrix A · Statute, regulator, launch status

Programme	Lead authority	Legal basis	Live date	Status 2026-05
🇧🇸 Sand Dollar	Central Bank of The Bahamas (CBOB)	CBOB Act 2020 (revised)	2020-10-20 (first ever nation-wide)	Live, 5+ years, slow growth
🇨🇳 e-CNY	PBoC + Digital Currency Research Institute	PBoC Law 2020 amendment	2020-04 (pilots)	Live, mass-rollout phase
🇰🇭 Bakong	National Bank of Cambodia (NBC)	NBC Law + payment-system framework	2020-10	Live, payment-system + quasi-CBDC hybrid
🇪🇨 DCash	Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB)	ECCB Agreement Act + sandbox	2021-03 pilot	Discontinued 2024-01 after 2-month outage
🇳🇬 eNaira	Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)	CBN Act 2007 (existing currency-issuance)	2021-10-25 (first African)	Live but de-emphasised
🇯🇲 JAM-DEX	Bank of Jamaica (BoJ)	BoJ (Amendment) Act 2022	2022-07	Live, modest growth
🇬🇧 digital pound	BoE + HMT	Existing BoE Acts; primary legislation required	Not live; Design Phase	No decision to launch

The earliest mover is Bahamas (2020-10) nation-wide and e-CNY (2020-04) pilots; the latest live programme is JAM-DEX (2022-07). The only discontinued programme is DCash (2024-01) — a cautionary data point, since DCash used the same Bitt vendor as Sand Dollar and eNaira. The UK is the only programme of the seven not yet committed to launch. Note: e-CNY pilots predate the Sand Dollar’s nation-wide launch by ~6 months, but PBoC has not declared “national launch”; e-CNY remains in an extended-pilot phase covering 26+ cities.

Matrix B · Legal-tender status and currency anchor

Programme	Legal-tender status	Currency anchor	Notes
Sand Dollar	Yes — direct CBOB liability	B$ (pegged 1:1 to USD)	Inherits Bahamian USD peg via fixed FX regime
e-CNY	Yes — direct PBoC liability	CNY (managed-float)	First major-economy CBDC with explicit legal-tender
Bakong	Quasi — Bakong is payment-system tokenising commercial-bank balances + KHR currency; not a pure central-bank-liability CBDC	KHR + USD (dual circulation)	Bakong supports both KHR and USD wallets; structurally a hybrid
DCash	Yes (during pilot)	XCD (pegged 1:1 to USD at XCD 2.70 per USD)	Discontinued 2024-01
eNaira	Yes — direct CBN liability	NGN (managed-float / de facto multi-band)	No explicit CBDC legislation; issued under existing CBN currency authority
JAM-DEX	Yes — explicit in BoJ Amendment Act 2022	J$ (managed-float)	Cleanest legal structure; dedicated CBDC amendment
digital pound	Contemplated; primary legislation required	GBP	Would be BoE liability if launched

The legal-tender split runs Jamaica > Bahamas > UK proposal > Nigeria > China > Cambodia > DCash. Jamaica’s BoJ Amendment Act 2022 is the cleanest dedicated-CBDC legislation; the UK would require primary legislation it has not yet introduced; China amended the PBoC Law in 2020; Nigeria leaned on pre-existing currency-issuance authority and is unique in never passing CBDC-specific legislation despite the eNaira being live for 4+ years.

Matrix C · Issuance and distribution model (direct vs intermediated)

Programme	Issuance model	Distribution layer	Anchor wallet
Sand Dollar	Two-tier intermediated	Authorized Financial Institutions (AFIs) — interoperable across AFIs	Multiple AFI wallets (Island Pay, KANOO, MoneyMaxx, bank wallets) — no single anchor
e-CNY	Two-tier intermediated	10 designated operators — six state-owned commercial banks + four payment/telecom operators (incl. ICBC, BOC, CCB, ABC, AliPay-via-MyBank, WeChat-via-WeBank)	Multiple but ICBC + AliPay + WeChat Pay dominant
Bakong	Hybrid; NBC operates Bakong settlement layer; commercial-bank balances tokenised	All Cambodian commercial banks + payment institutions	Bakong app (NBC-operated) + bank apps
DCash	Pilot via banks	ECCU commercial banks	DCash app (ECCB-operated)
eNaira	Two-tier intermediated	DMBs (deposit money banks) + MMOs (mobile money operators)	eNaira Speed Wallet (CBN-operated) + DMB wallet apps + USSD *997#
JAM-DEX	Two-tier intermediated	Authorised PSPs + DTIs	Lynk (NCB Financial Group’s TFOB subsidiary) — single dominant anchor
digital pound	Two-tier intermediated (proposed)	PIPs (Payment Interface Providers) + ESIPs (External Service Interface Providers)	Private-sector wallets only; BoE explicitly will not run consumer app

Distribution-channel-ownership is the binding adoption variable. JAM-DEX’s Lynk and e-CNY’s state-bank mandate aligned distribution incentives; Sand Dollar’s interoperable-AFI model is structurally clean but dilutes any single AFI’s marketing incentive; eNaira’s DMB+MMO stack had universally weak incentives (DMBs see eNaira as cannibalising fees, MMOs see it competing with their own e-money); DCash discontinuation traces to the same dilution dynamic plus operational vulnerability. The UK PIP/ESIP design has not been launch-tested.

Matrix D · KYC tier structure and per-wallet limits

Programme	Tier-1 (low-friction)	Tier-2 (verified)	Tier-3 (high-cap / business)
Sand Dollar	Phone-only; B$500 wallet / B$1,500 monthly tx	Gov-ID verified; B$8,000 wallet / B$10,000 monthly tx	Business wallet — KYB; higher caps by business type
e-CNY	Phone-only operator-tier; lowest cap CNY ~5,000 daily / 50,000 annual	ID-verified; higher operator-tier caps	Business + high-net-worth operator-tier; effectively uncapped within operator approval
Bakong	Phone + ID-light onboarding; ~$10,000 wallet cap	ID + bank-linked; higher caps	Business / cross-border (Thai PromptPay link); higher caps
DCash	Phone-only tier; gov-ID tier	Higher gov-ID tier	n/a (discontinued)
eNaira	Tier 0 — phone only, ₦120K daily / ₦300K max	Tier 1 BVN-light, Tier 2 BVN-full	Tier 3 bank-account-linked, higher caps
JAM-DEX	Standard PSP onboarding (Lynk-aligned)	Tiered by PSP; higher caps	Merchant tier
digital pound	n/a (proposed); no tier structure published in detail	n/a	Per-person holding cap proposed £10,000-£20,000 (not finalised)

Tier-1 caps as inclusion-targeting: every live programme attempted a low-friction tier for the unbanked; no live programme reports tier-1 dominance — the IMF Working Papers on Sand Dollar and eNaira both note that tier-2 (ID-verified) users dominate actual usage. The inclusion design is structurally correct but did not bind on the unbanked at the scale targeted. The UK digital pound, uniquely, considers a per-person holding cap (£10K-£20K) instead of a tiered-KYC structure — this is the biggest single design divergence across the seven programmes.

Matrix E · Adoption metrics — registered vs active vs population

Programme	Registered wallets	Active wallets (representative)	Adoption % of adult population
Sand Dollar	~30-50K personal + merchant	Single-digit-% of registered transacting monthly	<1% of pop (~400K total pop; small absolute base)
e-CNY	180M+ registered	Single-digit-million daily-active (large absolute, small percentage)	<1% daily-active; higher monthly-active by user count
Bakong	~10M+ Bakong-linked accounts (NBC)	Materially higher monthly active than peers due to QR-payment ubiquity	40-60% of adult pop (NBC public statements; payment-system blur)
DCash	<10K cumulative (peer estimates)	n/a (discontinued)	<0.5% of pop; one of the lowest
eNaira	~700K–900K Y1; subsequent estimates conflated	<1.5% of registered transacting (IMF)	<0.5% of adult pop (IMF Y1; no major step-change since)
JAM-DEX	~200K–300K Lynk-led	Materially smaller; BoJ has not disclosed precise daily-active	Several % of adult pop (~2M total adults; cleanest small-economy %)
digital pound	n/a (not live)	n/a	n/a

Cambodia Bakong is the outlier. Its 40-60% adoption figure reflects that Bakong is technically a payment-system + interoperability layer that absorbed the existing QR-payment market, not a pure central-bank-liability retail CBDC. The number is genuine on the payment-system reading but not directly comparable to Sand Dollar / eNaira / JAM-DEX adoption metrics. JAM-DEX is the cleanest small-economy success on a percentage-of-population basis among comparable pure-retail-CBDC peers. e-CNY is the largest absolute but small daily-active percentage, similar to the registered-vs-active gap in eNaira. DCash discontinuation is the only outright failure terminal-case.

Matrix F · Technology vendor and underlying tech

Programme	Vendor	Underlying tech	Notes
Sand Dollar	Bitt Inc. (Barbados)	Permissioned DLT (Bitt platform; Hyperledger Fabric variant)	Same vendor as eNaira + DCash; cluster has mixed-to-poor adoption outcomes
e-CNY	In-house PBoC (Digital Currency Research Institute)	Proprietary architecture; account-based with hardware-wallet capability	No external vendor; built entirely in-house at PBoC scale
Bakong	Soramitsu (Japan) + NBC	Hyperledger Iroha-based; bespoke implementation	Soramitsu (Tokyo) is the architectural lead — distinct from Bitt/eCurrency Mint cluster
DCash	Bitt Inc. (Barbados)	Same Bitt platform as Sand Dollar	Two-month outage in Jan-March 2022; discontinued 2024-01
eNaira	Bitt Inc. (Barbados)	Permissioned Hyperledger Fabric variant	Same Bitt vendor lineage as Sand Dollar / DCash
JAM-DEX	eCurrency Mint (US-HQ)	DSC2 (Digital Symbol Cryptography) hierarchical signatures	Distinct vendor from Bitt; cleanest small-economy adoption case in the seven-pole set
digital pound	Not publicly specified (vendor selection remains in progress during the Design Phase)	n/a; Phase 2 design ongoing	BoE has run exploratory vendor PoCs but has not publicly committed to a vendor

The Bitt vendor cluster (Sand Dollar / eNaira / DCash) covers three of the four worst adoption outcomes in the table. The eCurrency Mint deployment (JAM-DEX) is the cleanest small-economy outcome. In-house (e-CNY) and Soramitsu (Bakong) are the two non-Bitt/non-eCurrency Mint paths and both have stronger adoption — but with very different distribution models, so vendor choice is not the binding variable. The pattern is more “distribution design constrains vendor outcome reach” than “vendor capability determines adoption.” For more on the vendor / governance interaction see four core trade-offs in CBDC architecture selection.

Matrix G · Cross-border interoperability

Programme	Cross-border CBDC integration	Bilateral CBDC bridge	Wholesale-bridge participation
Sand Dollar	None	None	None
e-CNY	Yes — primary anchor of mBridge	HK link (GBA cross-boundary retail)	mBridge + future BRICS-Pay candidate
Bakong	Yes — Thai PromptPay bilateral + Lao + Malaysia + Vietnam interoperability	Thai PromptPay (live); ASEAN multilateral planned	Not in mBridge; ASEAN regional QR-network
DCash	None	None	n/a (discontinued)
eNaira	None	None	Not in mBridge / Agorá / Project Dunbar
JAM-DEX	None	None	None
digital pound	None at retail; BoE participates in BIS Project Agorá at wholesale level	None planned	Agorá wholesale

Cross-border CBDC adoption is concentrated in two programmes: e-CNY (via mBridge + GBA HK link) and Bakong (via PromptPay + ASEAN QR). The five remaining retail-CBDC programmes (Sand Dollar, DCash, eNaira, JAM-DEX, digital pound) have no cross-border CBDC integration as of 2026-05. This is the largest single gap in the small-economy retail-CBDC story — Caribbean and West-African programmes that would most benefit from cross-border remittance corridors have no CBDC-level bridge.

Matrix H · Issuance ↔ distribution incentive alignment scorecard

Programme	Issuer incentive	Distributor incentive	Anchor wallet	Aggregate score
Sand Dollar	High (CBOB committed)	Diluted across many AFIs; interoperability good for users, weak for distributor lock-in	None dominant	Medium
e-CNY	High (PBoC mandate)	High (state-bank mandate; AliPay / WeChat regulatory pressure)	AliPay + WeChat + ICBC	High
Bakong	High (NBC)	High (Bakong absorbed existing QR-payment payment economy)	Bakong app	High
DCash	High (ECCB)	Low (small ECCU banks; no anchor); operational fragility	None	Low (failed)
eNaira	High (CBN)	Low (DMBs cannibalised; MMOs competitive; agents prefer commissions)	None	Very low
JAM-DEX	High (BoJ)	High (NCB’s TFOB committed; Lynk anchor wallet)	Lynk	High
digital pound	Not publicly specified	Not publicly demonstrated (PIP/ESIP designed but unproven)	Private-sector PIPs only	Not publicly demonstrated

The single most powerful predictor of adoption among the live programmes is whether a single anchor distributor or wallet has aligned commercial incentive to push the CBDC. Jamaica’s Lynk = NCB Financial Group commitment; China’s state-bank mandate + AliPay/WeChat absorption; Cambodia’s Bakong-as-payment-system network effect. The three weakest cases (DCash, eNaira, Sand Dollar) all fail this test for different reasons (operational fragility, incentive misalignment, and incentive dilution respectively).

Why these dimensions

The eight matrix axes (statute, legal tender, issuance model, KYC tiers, adoption, technology vendor, cross-border, incentive alignment) were chosen because they map directly to the gating variables in the BIS/IMF CBDC adoption literature:

Statute / legal tender — determines legal enforceability and acceptance ceiling (theoretical max market share).
Issuance / distribution — determines who gets paid for distribution (the binding rate-of-adoption variable).
KYC tiers — determines accessibility floor for the unbanked (theoretical inclusion ceiling).
Adoption % — measures realised outcome (the only metric the public cares about).
Technology vendor — determines operational risk (DCash failure tied to vendor-platform fragility under load).
Cross-border — determines whether the CBDC has any role beyond domestic payments.
Incentive alignment — predicts the rate-of-adoption variable better than any other single measure.

Statute and legal tender are necessary but not sufficient; incentive alignment is sufficient when present (JAM-DEX, e-CNY, Bakong) and decisive when absent (eNaira, DCash, Sand Dollar). This is the central empirical finding the matrix view reveals that a per-jurisdiction narrative obscures.

Reading the matrix

The Bitt vendor cluster pattern: Sand Dollar, eNaira, DCash all used Bitt and all underperformed. The vendor is not the binding variable — distribution-incentive design is — but the vendor cluster correlation is striking enough that future small-economy programmes likely diversify vendors.
The “first ever” vs “best outcome” divergence: Bahamas was first (2020-10-20 nation-wide) but JAM-DEX (2022-07) has the cleanest adoption percentage. Speed-to-launch does not predict adoption quality.
DCash as the canonical failure: discontinued 2024-01 after a two-month outage in 2022 and persistent low adoption. The DCash post-mortem is now the most-cited case in the BIS CBDC operational-risk literature.
e-CNY as the registered-vs-active gap: 180M+ registered wallets and single-digit-million daily active is a 25-50× gap; the same pattern (smaller in scale) is visible in eNaira. Registered wallets do not equal active users in any retail CBDC.
digital pound as the indefinite-design-phase pattern: the BoE’s “design phase, not commitment to launch” framing is politically convenient and may keep the programme in design phase indefinitely without formally cancelling, mirroring the Riksbank’s e-krona path.
Bakong as the payment-system-CBDC hybrid: Bakong achieves the highest adoption-percentage of any programme in the matrix precisely because it absorbed the existing QR-payment market rather than competing with it — an option not available to a pure CBDC that competes with existing payment rails (UK Faster Payments, Brazil Pix, India UPI).

Sources

Central Bank of Nigeria — eNaira Design Paper (2021): https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2021/CCD/eNaira%20Design%20Paper.pdf
Central Bank of The Bahamas — Sand Dollar FAQ: https://www.centralbankbahamas.com/payments-system/the-sand-dollar/sand-dollar-faqs
Bank of Jamaica — CBDC / JAM-DEX project: https://boj.org.jm/core-functions/currency/cbdc/
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank — DCash project page (historic): https://www.eccb-centralbank.org/p/about-the-project
People’s Bank of China — public CBDC research and pilot updates: https://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/index.html
National Bank of Cambodia — Bakong public materials: https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/economic_research/bakong.php
Bank of England — digital pound landing: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/the-digital-pound
IMF Working Paper — Nigeria’s eNaira One Year After (Ree, 2023): https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2023/05/12/Nigerias-eNaira-One-Year-After-533487
IMF Working Paper — Bahamas’s Sand Dollar: CBDC and Lessons Learned (Kosse, Mattei, Glowka, 2022): https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2022/06/10/The-Bahamas-Sand-Dollar-CBDC-and-Lessons-Learned-518864
BIS Working Paper No. 1116 — “The next-generation monetary system — a blueprint” (2024): https://www.bis.org/publ/work1116.htm
BIS Innovation Hub CBDC topic landing: https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc.htm